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Understanding the Limited Effect of Moizof v.
United States On Wrongful Death Damages

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act
CYRUS B. RICHARDSON, m"
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act) is a limited waiver of the
United States's sovereign immunity to certain tort claims. In the FrCA,
Congress authorized damage suits against the United States for harm caused

by the negligence or misconduct of any federal employee acting within the

scope of his or her employment, to the same extent that a private person would
be liable under state law.' In dealing with such claims, the Act generally
provides that the remedy available under state law is incorporated into the
statute.2 However, there are some important exceptions to the waiver. Most
notably, Congress excluded punitive damages from the damages available
under the FTCA.'
As a result of the exclusion of punitive damages from FrCA awards,

damage calculations in wrongful death cases are often perceived to be

* Trial Counsel and Brigade Legal Advisor, Aviation Brigade, 3d Infantry Division
(Mechanized), Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; A.B. 1992, Duke University; J.D. 1995, New
York University. The author would like to thank his family and friends for their support in this
endeavor, and in particular Diana Hassel, Associate Professor, Roger Williams University
School of Law, for her insight, comments, and encouragement.
1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994). 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides that:
(Tihe district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims. . . for money damages... for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). 28 U.S.C. § 2674 states that:
The United States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not
be liable for interest prior to judgment or punitive damages.
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place
where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United
States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought ....
3. See Id.
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confusing aspects of FTCA litigation. This confusion lies in the determination
of which aspects of a state's wrongful death damage award are permitted by
the FTCA and which are barred by the Act's punitive damage exclusion. Prior
to 1992, most courts held that damage awards that exceeded a plaintiff's loss
were barred by the Act's prohibition on punitive damages even if greater
amounts were recoverable from a private defendant for the same tort." These
courts limited FTCA wrongful death damage awards to actual or
compensatory damages based on the plaintiff s loss.5 These courts considered
damage awards that exceeded a plaintiff's loss to be punitive.6 Consequently,
courts generally excluded money that would have been used for the decedent's
taxes and the decedent's consumption from the FTCA wrongful death damage
awards because the plaintiffs would never have benefitted from that money.7

4. See, e.g., Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111(4th Cir. 1983), cert.denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984) (To the extent that an award gives more than the actual loss suffered by
the claimant, it is 'punitive' .... "); Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 1976);
("[I]n deciding if a statute is punitive, we look not to its language nor the state court's
characterization of it. . . we look to its effect."); Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th
Cir. 1969)("[T]o the extent ... [that the Georgia wrongful death statute] permits recovery of
more than the loss to the survivor it is punitive."); contraKalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d
809, 811 n. I (6th Cir. 1978)("Damages are 'punitive' only when awarded separately for the sole
purpose of punishing a tortfeasor who inflicted injuries 'maliciously or wantonly, and with
circumstances of contumely or indignity."')(citing Milwaukee R.R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489,
493 (1875)).
5. See, e.g., Flannery, 718 F.2d at 111 ("The FTCA's proscription of awards of
punitive damages authorizes only those awards that compensate or reimburse, or provide
recompense or redress for injuries suffered by the claimant."); Felder,543 F.2d at 669 ("[Ihe
purpose of the FTCA is compensation ... it is intended to repay the amount of loss or injury
sustained by a plaintiff...."); Hartz,415 F.2d at 265 ("[T]he trial court, in a federal tort claims
act, cannot award a judgment in excess of the injury suffered .... ); contra Kalavity, 584 F.2d
at 811 ('Tort law may award as customary damages something more than simply out-of-pocket
loss, something for deterrence without spilling over into 'punitive' damages awarded solely for
the purpose of punishment.").
6. See, e.g., Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984) ('To the extent that an award gives more than the actual loss suffered by
the claimant, it is 'punitive' .... "); Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1969)
("[To the extent ... [that the Georgia wrongful death statute] permits recovery of more than
the loss to the survivor it is punitive."); contra Kalavity v. United States, 584 F.2d 809, 811 n. 1
(6th Cir. 1978) ("[D]amages are 'punitive' only when awarded separately for the sole purpose
of punishing a tortfeasor who inflicted injuries 'maliciously or wantonly, and with
circumstances of contumely or indignity."') (citing Milwaukee R.R. Co. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489,
493 (1875)).
7. See, e.g., Flannery,718 F.2d at 111 ("[F]ederal income taxes must be deducted in
computing lost future earnings. .. ."); Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir.
1982) ("The [FTCA's] prohibition [against punitive damages] would also seem to imply that,
like [the decedent's] other personal expenses, income taxes must be deducted."); Felder v.
United States, 543 F.2d at 670 ("Since failure to deduct income taxes would result in plaintiffs
receiving greater financial support than they [normally] would have ... the effect of such an
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However, in the 1992 FTCA personal injury case Moizof v. United
States,' the Supreme Court held that the FTCA's punitive damages exclusion
bars only the recovery of what are legally considered to be punitive damages
according to traditional common law principles.9 Punitive damages, according
to traditional common law principles, are those damages that satisfy a two-part

test; they require proof that (1) the defendant engaged in intentional or

egregious conduct, and (2) the damages have a punitive purpose.' °
Few recent cases have interpreted Moizof." Consequently, judges and

practitioners must carefully consider the effect of Moizof on FTCA wrongful
death damage awards. This article examines Moizof s limited effect on the
calculation of wrongful death damages in order to curtail the misinterpretation

and misapplication of the FTCA in light of the Molzof decision.
First, the Molzof holding should be confined to FTCA personal injury
cases. The Molzof holding should not be applied to FTCA wrongful death
cases. Wrongful death damages are different from personal injury damages.
Damage awards in wrongful death cases compensate for the losses of people
other than the decedent. 12 Most wrongful death statutes are designed to
compensate a decedent's family members for their economic loss. 3 The

award ...[is] 'punitive."'); contra Kalavity, 584 F.2d at 813 ("(N]o reduction need be
calculated for the absence of income taxes... for ordinary cases involving loss of future
earnings."). See also Fred S. McChesney, Problems in Calculating and Awarding
CompensatoryDamagesfor Wrongful Death Under the FederalTort Claims Act, 36 EMORY
L.J. 149, 149-158 (1987) (discussing court decisions that excluded taxes and personal
expenditures from FTCA wrongful death damage awards because they violated the Act's
prohibition on punitive damages).
8. 502 U.S. 301 (1992).
9. Id. at 312.
10. See id.; see also Brewer v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 741, 745 (N.D. Iil. 1994)
(discussing the Molzof definition of "punitive damages").
11. See Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that
Molzof held that "the punitive damages proscription of the FTCA ...bars only those awards
that under traditional state law analysis operate to punish the defendant for the degree of
wrongfulness of his conduct."); Childs v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1584 (S.D. Ga.
1996) (citing Molzof for the proposition that "'[p]unitive damages' is a term of art which has
particular meaning under state law, and any damages that are not technically considered
'punitive damages' under the relevant state law are available to a plaintiff proceeding under the
FTCA."); Brewer, 864 F. Supp. at 745 (explaining that "the damages sought in Molzofwere not
'punitive damages' because they did not satisfy a two part test: the recoverability of damages
must depend on proof that the defendant has engaged in intentional or egregious misconduct,
and the purpose of the damages must be to punish.").
12. See Thomas R. Ireland and James D. Rodgers, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful
Death/SurvivalActions:Equitable Compensationor OptimalLife Protection?,J. LEGALECON.
DEC. 1993, at 43, 45-46 ("In most states, it is quite clear in their wrongful death acts that
survivors may only recover their own losses, not the losses suffered by the decedent.").
13. See W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, and David G. Owen,
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decedent's family members recover the economic benefits that they would
have received from the decedent during the rest of the decedent's lifetime if
the decedent had not been killed. 4 The decedent is dead; no amount of money
can make the decedent whole."5 Personal injury damage awards on the other
hand, compensate the victim for the victim's injuries. In personal injury
cases, courts consider the amount of money that would allow "the wrongfully
injured person to purchase goods and services that are as enjoyable as those
precluded by the injury, thus making the injured party in some sense whole."' 6
Thus, given the different natures of wrongful death and personal injury
damages, it is inappropriate to apply the holding of Moizof, a personal injury
case, to wrongful death cases.
In addition, Congress recognized a distinction between wrongful death
and other torts. In the 1947 amendment to the FTCA, Congress stated:
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law
of the place where the act or omission complained of
occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for
damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was
7
brought ....
While punitive damages are not permitted in FTCA personal injury or
wrongful death claims, Congress placed further limitations on the damages
available for wrongful death claims. By distinguishing wrongful death from
other torts in the 1947 amendment to the FTCA, Congress confined the
Government's liability in wrongful death actions to actual or compensatory
damages based on the plaintiff's pecuniary loss. Second, even if Molzof were
extended to wrongful death cases, the portions of a state's wrongful death
statute that are punitive would still be excluded from a wrongful death damage
award.
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing survival and
wrongful death damages). A minority of states base damages on the estate's loss rather than the
survivor's loss. Id. See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 185-89 (1987) (discussing the general features of wrongful death
damage awards and the limitations of modem wrongful death damage awards).
14. Id.

15.

Thomas R. Ireland and James D. Rodgers, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful

DeathSurvivalActions:Equitable Compensation or Optimal Life Protection?,J. LEGALECON.
DEC. 1993, at 43,46 (1993) ("Dead people can't be compensated.").
16. Id.at 46.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
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Moreover, this article analyzes a 1996 Southern District of Georgia
decision, Childs v. United States 8 , that arguably misapplied Moizof. The
Childs court should not have extended Moizof, a personal injury decision, to
the Childs case,.a wrongful death action. Nonetheless, even if Moizof were
applicable to FTCA wrongful death claims, the Childs court misapplied it.
Molzofsupports the proposition that the punitive portions of a state's wrongful
death statute should be excluded when figuring FTCA wrongful death damage
awards. The Moizof court acknowledged that the FTCA made the United
States liable for state law damages that were designed to compensate for
injuries resulting from the tort, but not liable for damage awards intended to
punish for egregious conduct. 9 In light of Moizof, courts should exclude the

punitive portions of a state's wrongful death act when calculating damages in

FTCA wrongful death actions. However, the Childs court failed to exclude
the punitive portions of Georgia's wrongful death statute. By failing to
exclude the punitive damages portions of Georgia's wrongful death statute,
the Government paid more in damages than Congress intended. The Childs
court's misinterpretation of Moizof s effect on FTCA wrongful death damages
led to a damage award that does not comport with the FTCA or Moizof.
I. MOLZOF V. UNITED STATES
In October of 1986, Robert Molzof underwent lung surgery at a
Veteran's Administration (VA) hospital in Wisconsin.2 ° As a result of
negligence on the part of federal employees acting within their scope of
employment, Mr. Molzof's ventilator tube became disconnected. 2' Mr.
Molzof was deprived of oxygen and consequently suffered irreversible brain
damage, leaving him permanently comatose.2 2
Mr. Molzof' s guardian ad litem brought suit seeking supplemental
medical care, future medical expenses, past and future loss of consortium, and
damages for loss of enjoyment of life.23 The United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin determined that the free care that the
Government had provided Mr. Molzof via the VA was reasonable and
adequate.24 Shirley Molzof, Mr. Molzof' s wife, was satisfied with the care

18.
19.
20.
(1992).

923 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
Molzof, 502 U.S. at 306.
See Molzofv. United States, 911 F.2d 18, 19 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 502 U.S. 301

21.
22.

See id.

24.

See id. at 19.

23.

See id.
See id. at 19-20.
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and had no intention of transferring her husband to a private facility.25 There
was no indication that a neighboring hospital could provide similar
treatment.26 The court ordered the VA to continue to treat and care for the
plaintiff.2 7
The District Court awarded $75,750.00 for future medical expenses and
$150,000.00 for past and future loss of consortium. 2 However, the court
declined to award loss of enjoyment of life damages.29 The court reasoned
that Mr. Molzof should not receive loss of enjoyment of life damages because
his comatose condition kept him from even being aware of any damage
award.3" Mr. Molzof died after the court entered the final judgment. " Mrs.
Molzof, the personal representative for Mr. Molzof' s estate, appealed the
decision.3 2
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's
decision and rejected the petitioner's request for $1.3 million for future
medical expenses.33 The Seventh Circuit stated that an award for future
medical care would duplicate the free medical services already provided to
Mr. Molzof by the VA hospital.'
Because such an award would
overcompensate the plaintiff for his actual losses, it was barred by the Act's
prohibition on punitive damages.3"
The loss of enjoyment of life claim was barred because such an award
did not redress the incognizable loss of the comatose patient.3 6 The Court
stated that the Act proscribed damages "in excess of those necessary to
compensate for injuries suffered by the plaintiff" and that an award for loss
of enjoyment of life could not compensate a comatose patient who was not
cognizant of a loss.3 7 Thus, the FTCA's prohibition against punitive damages
precluded a damage award for loss of enjoyment.3

25.
26.
27.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 20

37.
38.

Id.
See id.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id. at 20 n.3.
See id. at 20.
See id.
See Molzofv. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 304 (1992).
See id.
See Molzof, 911 F.2d at 21-22.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 20-21.
See id. at 22.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari" to consider the meaning of the
damages" as used in the Act. Justice Thomas, writing for the
"punitive
term
unanimous Court, stated that the Act's prohibition against punitive damages
is a matter of federal law and that "punitive damages" is a legal term of art
with a widely accepted meaning.' The Supreme Court ruled that the punitive
damage exclusion only barred the recovery "of what are legally considered to
be 'punitive damages' under traditional common-law principles."'" The Court
reasoned that, absent any contrary indication, Congress must be presumed to
have had the traditional common law meaning in mind when it drafted the
FTCA.42 The Court determined that a damage award is punitive under the
traditional common law meaning if its recoverability depends on proof that (1)
the defendant engaged in intentional or egregious misconduct, and (2) the
purpose of the damages is to punish.43
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's view that any award that
exceeds what is necessary to fairly compensate the plaintiff is barred by the
Act." The Government contended that "punitive damages" referred to all
damages that exceeded or duplicated the loss, or bore no relation to
compensation.4"
The Supreme Court noted that the Government must have interpreted §
2674 to provide that the United States "shall be liable only for compensatory
damages."' However, the first clause of § 2674 clearly states that the United
States "shall not be liable for punitive damages.
The difference [between "shall be liable only for
compensatory damages" and "shall not be liable for punitive
damages"] is important. The statutory language suggests
that to the extent a plaintiff may be entitled to damages that

39. See Molzof v. United States, 499 U.S. 918 (1991).

40. See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 306 (1992).
41. Id. at 312.
42. See id. at 307-308.
43. Molzof, 502 U.S. at 305-306 (agreeing with petitioner's argument that "[s]ection
2674 must be interpreted to permit awards against the United States of those state law damages
which are intended by state law to act as compensation for injuries sustained as a result of the
tort, and to preclude awards of damages which are intended to act as punishment for egregious
conduct"), id. at 312 (stating that the future medical expenses and loss of enjoyment of life
damages were "not punitive damages under the common law or the FTCA because their
[did] not depend upon any proof that the defendant... engaged in intentional
recoverability ...
or egregious misconduct and their purpose... [was] not to punish").
44. Id. at 306.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 308.
47. Id.
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are not legally considered "punitive damages," but which
are for some reason above and beyond ordinary notions of
compensation, the United States is liable "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual."
These damages in the "gray" zone are not by definition
"punitive damages" barred under the
Act.48
The Supreme Court also rejected the Government's argument that the
second clause of § 2674 confirmed the compensatory purpose of the Act and
showed Congress' intent to define "punitive damages" by contrasting them
with actual or compensatory damages.49 The Court rejected this argument
because "punitive damages" is a well-established legal term of art and that the
second clause applies only in wrongful death cases."
The Court further noted that it would be "difficult and impractical" to
apply the Government's interpretation of "punitive damages."'5 The Court
opined that under the Government's interpretation of "punitive damages," Mr.
Molzof' s future medical expenses would be reduced by the amount that he
would save on rent, meals, clothing, and other daily living expenses while he
was hospitalized. 52 According to the Court, "The difficulties inherent in
attempting to prove such offsets would be enormous." 53
Consequently, even though an award for the petitioner's claim for future
medical expenses and loss of enjoyment of life exceeded what was ordinarily
required to compensate the petitioner, such an award was not necessarily
prohibited by the Act.' Because the petitioner's claims for future medical
expenses and loss of enjoyment of life were grounded solely in a simple
negligence theory and were not intended to punish the tortfeasor, the Supreme
Court found that the lower court erred in determining that the FTCA barred

48.
49.

Molzof, 502 U.S. at 308.
Id. at 309.

50.

Id.

54.

See id. at 308-12.

51. Id. (stating that the Government's argument that "the second clause of 2674
confirms the compensatory purpose of the statute and demonstrates that Congress intended to
define 'punitive damages' by contrasting them with 'actual or compensatory damages' . . . is
undermined ... not only by the fact that "punitive damages" is a legal term of art with a wellestablished common-law meaning, but also by the Government's own statement, although the
second clause defines "actual or compensatory damages" as "the 'pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death,' the 'pecuniary' injuries standard does not apply in determining compensatory
damages in any other kind of tort suit against the United States").
52. Molzof, 502 U.S. at 309-10.
53. Id. at 310.
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the damages and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
55
damages that the petitioner sought were recoverable under Wisconsin law.
A. MOLZOF IS LIMITED TO FTCA PERSONAL INJURY CASES

Molzof should be limited to personal injury cases. Molzof is an FTCA
56
personal injury case, not a wrongful death case. FTCA personal injury
5
damages should be distinguished from FTCA wrongful death damages. "
First, the statutory language and legislative history of the FTCA show that
Congress distinguished wrongful death from other torts. Unlike the general
FTCA tort remedy, the wrongful death remedy is narrowly defined as the
5
plaintiff's actual or compensatory damages based on pecuniary loss."
Second, the language of the Molzof decision demonstrates that the Supreme
Court did not intend Molzof to apply to FTCA wrongful death cases.
Consequently, courts should not overextend the Moizof decision. If the
Moizof decision is overextended, then FTCA wrongful death plaintiffs will
receive damage awards that exceed those intended by Congress.
1. The Statutory Languageand Legislative History of The FTCA
Demonstratethat CongressIntended to DistinguishBetween Wrongful
Death and Other Tort Suits
Congress distinguished wrongful death from other torts. The statutory
language and the legislative history of the FTCA demonstrate Congress' intent
to provide a uniform method of determining damages in wrongful death cases.
Although tort damages under the FTCA are generally determined by applying

55. Id.at 312.
56. Molzof, 502 U.S. 301.
57. In Brereton v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 752, n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1997) the court
recognized the distinction between FTCA wrongful death cases and personal injury cases. The
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that Molzofpermitted recovery of hedonic damages in FTCA

wrongful death cases when federal courts apply the Michigan Wrongful Death Act. Id. ("That
such damages [hedonic damages] might be available under the FTCA in a personal injury case
brought on behalf of the victim is irrelevant to whether hedonic damages are available under the
...[Michigan Wrongful Death Act].") (emphasis added).

58.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994). 28 U.S.C. § 2674 states:

If, however, in any case wherein death was caused,the law of the place

where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been
construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United

States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought....
(emphasis added).
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state law damage rules, the Act explicitly addresses wrongful death damages.5 9
The second paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 2674 demonstrates Congress'
intent to measure FTCA wrongful death damages based on the plaintiff's loss:
If ...in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the
place where the act or omission complained of occurred
provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages
only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for
actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons
respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought ....
This language was added by a 1947 amendment because the Department
of Justice had moved for the dismissal of wrongful death claims brought in
Alabama and Massachusetts.' The Alabama and Massachusetts statutes
conflicted with the FTCA's prohibition on punitive damages because they
only permitted the recovery of punitive damages awards in wrongful death
cases. 6 Consequently, Congress created the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 to provide plaintiffs in Alabama and Massachusetts with a remedy in
FTCA wrongful death cases.62 Congress defined the remedy for FTCA
wrongful death plaintiffs as "actual or compensatory damages, measured by
the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death. 63
Congress' addition of the second paragraph did more than merely
provide an FTCA wrongful death remedy in Alabama and Massachusetts; it
served as a means for Congress to effectuate the policy goal of setting a
uniform method of calculating recoverable damages in FTCA cases. Congress
viewed the amendment as a means to make the settlement of wrongful death
damage claims consistent among the states. 64 In explaining the bill to amend
the FTCA to provide a remedy for plaintiffs in states whose wrongful death
statutes only award punitive damages, the Committee Reports and a

59. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
60. H.R. Rep. No. 80-748, at 1548 (1947).
61. H.R. Rep. No. 80-748, at 1548 (1947).
62. Id.
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
64. See Unpublished hearings, quoted in Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128, 131 (1956). See also H.R. Rep. No. 80-748, at 1548 (1947) ('The result
of conflict of laws has been that the Department of Justice has moved for the dismissal of death
claims brought in both these States [Alabama and Massachusetts] under the Federal Tort Claims
Act on the theory that the purpose of the Act was to compensate for the loss actually suffered
rather than for the culpability involved in the tort committed.... This bill simply amends the
Federal Tort Claims Act so that it shall grant to the people of the two States the right of action

already granted to the people in the other 46.").
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spokesman for the Comptroller General implied that, when Congress
originally passed the Act, Congress had intended to make the Government
only liable for compensatory damages:
Since in those two states [Alabama and Massachusetts]
compensatory damages are not allowed [in wrongful death
cases], all that is required is to amend the Federal Tort
Claims Act to say that in such states compensatory damages
shall be allowed... It is believed that suggestion would
eliminate the discrepancy and would make the settlement of
claims in those two states to be exactly in accordwith the
general rules followed in the other 46 states .....
Thus, by amending the FTCA, Congress defined the damages available in
FTCA wrongful death actions as compensatory damages based on pecuniary
loss.
Interpreting the second paragraph of § 2674 to authorize only
compensatory damages in FTCA wrongful death damages is consistent with
the interpretations of other federal statutes that address awards in death cases.
Prior to the creation of the FTCA, Congress enacted the Federal Employers'
Liability Act" (FELA) and the Death on the High Seas Act 7 (DOHSA).
65. Unpublished hearings, quoted in Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128, 131 (1956) (emphasis added). However, the issue remains: why is
Congress concerned about consistency in the general calculation of wrongful death damages,
yet allows other inconsistencies to remain? For example, Congress permitted FTCA personal
injury damages to be calculated according to state law. This certainly permits a variety of FTCA
personal injury award calculations among the states. Congress appears to have been most
concerned about achieving consistency in calculating wrongful death damages. Arguably, this
is because the calculations of wrongful death damages awards had been very disparate as
evidenced by the fact that Alabama and Massachusetts had permitted only punitive damages in
wrongful death cases. See supra note 64.
66. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994). 45 U.S.C. § 51 states:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce... shall
be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed
by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such
employee, to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the
surviving [dependent relatives].., for such injury or death resulting in
whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or
employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
67. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1994) (repealed 1986). 46 U.S.C. § 761 states:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring on the high seas... the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages.., for the exclusive benefit of
the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against
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Damages available under these statutes are limited to compensatory damages
based on pecuniary loss. 6' This standard is similar to the one articulated in
the 1947 amendment to the FTCA.69

The pecuniary injury standard is based on the actual injuries suffered by
the plaintiff.7" These damages should compensate a plaintiff for the

reasonably expected benefits that the plaintiff would have received had the
decedent lived.7 Consequently, money that dependent relatives would not

have received if the decedent had lived must be excluded from the pecuniary
72
standard damage awards.
The 1947 Amendment to the FTCA demonstrated that Congress intended
to create a uniform policy regarding the calculation of FTCA wrongful death
damages. Congress applied the pecuniary injury standard to FTCA wrongful
death damage awards. Thus, legislative intent, as well as guidance from

the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. § 762 (1994) (repealed 1986) addresses damages in DOHSA cases. 46 U.S.C. § 762
states:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is
brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in proportion
to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the death of the
person by whose representative the suit is brought.
68. The Supreme Court interpreted FELA to permit recovery of pecuniary loss only.
See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485,489 (1916); Michigan Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1913). DOHSA explicitly limits recovery in wrongful death
suits to "pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought." 46
U.S.C. § 762 (1994) (repealed 1986). The damages available under DOHSA are the same as
under FELA. See Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934).
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
70. See Chesapeake &Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485,489 (1916) (FELA) ("The
damages should be equivalent to compensation for the derivation of the reasonable expectation
of pecuniary benefits that would have resulted from the continued life of the deceased.").
71. Id. Many factors have been held proper for consideration of the pecuniary injuries
suffered by a plaintiff. These include: the income the decedent was earning at the time of the
decedent's death, the decedent's health and habits, the length of time the decedent had worked
for the decedent's employer, the likelihood that the decedent would have retained the decedent's
job, the prospects for promotion or demotion, the decedent's and the decedent's dependent
family members' life expectancies, and the likelihood that the decedent would have supported
family members. O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1959); see also
Montellier v. United States, 202 F.Supp. 384, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (discussing factors
considered in determining pecuniary loss).
72. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 493-94 (1980) ("It
follows inexorably that the wage earner's income tax is a relevant factor in calculating the
monetary loss suffered by his dependents when he dies.") (a FELA case).
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previously enacted wrongful death statutes, indicate that the pecuniary injury
standard should be applied to FTCA wrongful death damage awards.
2. The Language of Molzof Demonstratesthat FTCA Wrongful Death
CasesAre Distinguishedfrom Other Tort Cases
In Moizof, the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between
wrongful death and other types of torts. The Government argued that the
FTCA's prohibition on punitive damages precluded the Court from awarding
future medical expenses and loss of enjoyment of life damages when such
damages would overcompensate a plaintiff." In addition, the Government
claimed that the second clause of § 2674 confirmed the compensatory purpose
of the Act and demonstrated that Congress intended to define "punitive
damages" by contrasting them with "actual compensatory damages. 7 4 The
Supreme Court rejected these arguments, stating that they were:
undermined... not only by the fact that "punitive damages"
is a legal term of art with a well-established common law
meaning, but also by the Government's own statement that
although the second clause defines "actual or compensatory
damages" as "the pecuniary injuries resulting from such
death," the "pecuniary injuries" standard does not apply in
determining compensatory damages in any other kind of tort
suit against the United States."
The Supreme Court noted the Government's concession that the second
paragraph applies only to wrongful death suits. 76 Consequently, the Supreme
Court did not apply the articulated wrongful death standard to the personal
injury claim in Moizof."
The Supreme Court's acknowledgment that the pecuniary injury standard
does not apply when determining compensatory damages to suits other than
wrongful death suits demonstrates the Supreme Court's recognition of a
distinction between the remedies available for wrongful death and other torts.
Thus, by inference, the Supreme Court's interpretation of "punitive damages"
in Moizofis necessarily limited to tortious conduct other than wrongful death.

73.

Molzof v.United States, 502 U.S. 301,312 (1992).

75.
76.
77.

Id.
See id.
Id.

74.

Id. at 309.
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II. EVEN IF MOLZOF WERE EXTENDED To FTCA WRONGFUL DEATH

CASES, FTCA WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGE AWARDS WOULD STILL
EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF THE DAMAGE AWARD THAT ARE NOT PUNITIVE

Even if the Molzof decision were extended to FTCA wrongful death
cases, courts should exclude the portions of damage awards that are punitive.
If a state's wrongful death statute is partially punitive, Molzof suggests that a
court should ascertain which part of the award is punitive and exclude it from
the damage award; only the compensatory award portion would remain.78
In Moizof, the Supreme Court recognized two factors for courts to
consider when determining whether a damage award is barred by the FTCA's
punitive damages prohibition. First, damages are prohibited if their
recoverability depends upon "proof that the defendant has engaged in
intentionalor egregiousmisconduct."7 9 Second, damages are prohibited if
"their purpose is... to punish."8' Courts need to consider these factors when
evaluating a state's wrongful death damages under the FTCA.
In Molzof, the Supreme Court found this two-part test applicable in
evaluating which damages were available under Wisconsin law. a'
The
Supreme Court found that Mr. Molzof' s future medical expenses and loss of
enjoyment of life claims were grounded solely on a simple negligence theory
because the recoverability of these claims did not depend upon any proof that
the defendant engaged in intentional or egregious conduct.8 2 The Supreme
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether such damages were
recoverable as compensatory damages under Wisconsin law.83 By remanding
the case for determination on whether future medical expenses and loss of
enjoyment of life claims were recoverable as compensatory damages under
Wisconsin law, the Supreme Court indicated that courts must determine
whether the damages sought are recoverable as compensatory under state
law. 4 Thus, when determining which damages are recoverable in wrongful
death cases, courts must look to the state's wrongful death statute. If a state's
wrongful death statute has a punitive purpose, then those damages must be
excluded from the award; if the purpose is not punitive, then the damages are
included.8"
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.

See Molzof, 502 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).

Id.

Id.

83. Id. ("It may be that under Wisconsin law the damages sought in this case are not
recoverable as compensatory damages.").

84.
85.

See id.
See id.
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Initially, Molzof may appear to reject an inquiry into the nature of
damages under state law. The Supreme Court noted that the government's
interpretation of "punitive damages" as any award exceeding compensation
would be impractical to apply, stating that it would be difficult for the court
to prove offsets, such as the money a comatose victim would save on rent,
meals, clothing and other daily living expenses. 6
Determining the content of wrongful death awards, however, is different
than determining the content of personal injury awards. In figuring personal
injury awards, it is appropriate to consider the plaintiff's lost ability to
perform certain activities that the individual enjoyed. 7 On the other hand,
most states limit survivor's recovery in wrongful death actions to the
survivor's own loss, not to the losses of the decedent."s Unlike personal injury
damages, wrongful death damages can be determined with reasonable
accuracy. There is less difficulty and impracticability in determining the
content of damage awards in wrongful death cases because, unlike personal
injury cases, the damages are fixed at the time of the tort because the victim
is dead. There are no lingering living expenses to consider as there are in
personal injury cases.89 Furthermore, mortality tables provide guidance as to
the life expectancy of the decedent.
I. CHILDS V. UNITED STATES: 9° MISAPPLICATION OF THE MOLZOF DECISION

The District Court for the Southern District of Georgia's decision, Childs
v. United States, misapplied the Molzof decision. In Childs, a United States
Postal Service truck wrongfully entered an intersection and struck Debra
Childs's vehicle, killing Ms. Childs, her eight-month-old fetus, and her sixyear-old passenger.9 ' The plaintiffs brought suit against the United States
under the FTCA seeking damages for the decedents' wrongful deaths, pain
and suffering, and funeral expenses. They contended that the FTCA and
Georgia's wrongful death statute mandated that their recovery should not be
reduced by the taxes or personal expenses that the decedents would have
incurred.92
86. Id. at 309-310.
87. Ireland & Rodgers, supra note 13, at 46.
88. Id. at 45-46.
89. Personal injury awards must take into account the continued injuries suffered by the
victim of a tort. See Brereton v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 752, n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("..
. [Tihe plaintiff in Molzof was not dead and, thus, was suffering an actual, physical loss of
enjoyment of life caused by his injury.").
90. 923 F. Supp. 1570 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
91. Id. at 1572.
92. Id. at 1581.
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The Georgia wrongful death statute permits the recovery of the "full
value of the life of a decedent."9 3 The Georgia Code defines "full value of the
life of the decedent" as the "full value of the life of the decedent without
deducting for any of the necessary or personal expenses of the decedent had
he lived. 9 4
The district court had to determine whether the Georgia wrongful death
statute's mandate that courts ignore a decedent's personal expenses and taxes
when determining the full value of life resulted in punitive damage awards
under the FTCA.95 The plaintiffs argued that, under the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the FTCA in Moizof, the FTCA's prohibition against punitive
damages does not require the deduction of personal expenses.9 6 The
government, on the other hand, argued that the FTCA's prohibition against
punitive damages required a reduction for personal expenses and taxes to
prevent awarding damages that were not solely compensatory. 9
Prior to rejecting the Government's position, the Childs court discussed
Hardenv. UnitedStates", the Fifth Circuit case that had previously controlled
FTCA wrongful death cases involving the Georgia wrongful death statute. 99
In Harden, the parents of a fifteen-year-old boy brought an FTCA wrongful
death action after their son was accidentally shot by a federal ranger who was
investigating raucous activities at a campsite."
The Harden court held that the FTCA's prohibition against punitive
damages required a court to deduct personal expenses and taxes from damage
awards in FTCA cases when applying the Georgia wrongful death statute.' °'
The Harden court reasoned that, because a decedent's living expenses and
taxes would reduce the income available to the decedent's family had the
decedent lived, the failure to deduct these items would result in an award that
exceeded necessary compensation.'0 2 Such damages were, therefore, punitive
in effect and barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2674. "3
The Childs court rejected the Harden holding in light of the Moizof
decision, stating, "'Punitive damages' is a term of art which has particular
meaning under state law, and any damages that are not technically considered
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-2,-3,-5(a) (1982); Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1581.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-1(1) (1982); Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1581.
Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1583.
Id. at 1581.

98.

688 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1982).

97.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.

See Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1583-84.
Harden, 688 F.2d at 1026-27.
Id.at 1029.

Id.
d.
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'punitive damages' under the relevant state law are available to a plaintiff
proceeding under the FTCA."' The court determined that punitive damages
are not available under Georgia's wrongful death statute.' °" Thus, the
are either
damages available under the Georgia wrongful death ' statute
6
compensatory or fall into the Molzof-termed "gray zone." 10
Consequently, the Childs court ruled that the Georgia wrongful death
statute's mandate that the "full value of life" be figured without deducting the
decedent's personal expenses and taxes does not amount to a punitive damage
award under the FTCA.Y The court refused to consider the decedents'
personal expenses and taxes when it determined the value of their lives. °8
The court awarded the plaintiffs wrongful death damages in the following
amounts: $1.35 million for Ms. Childs; $1.08 million for her fetus; and, $1.34
million for the six-year-old passenger." 9
A. MOLZOF DOES NOT CONTROL CHILDS BECAUSE CHILDS IS A WRONGFUL
DEATH CASE

Moizofdoes not control Childs because Childs is a wrongful death case;
whereas Molzof is a personal injury case. In amending 28 U.S.C. § 2674,
Congress explicitly recognized a distinction between wrongful death and other
torts under the FTCA. The Act limits the government's liability in wrongful
death cases to compensatory damages based on a plaintiff's pecuniary loss." 0
In addition, the Molzof court acknowledged the distinction between personal
injury claims and wrongful death claims by pointing out that the second
paragraph of § 2674 applies only to wrongful death claims."' Consequently,
the Childs court should not have applied the Moizof decision to the Childs
case. The Childs court should not have awarded the Childs wrongful death
plaintiffs damages that exceeded their actual losses. Specifically, taxes and
living expenses should have been deducted from the award.

104. Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1584.
105. Id. (citing Engle v. Finch, 139 S.E. 868 (Ga. 1927); Truelove v. Wilson, 285 S.E.2d
556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Roescher v. Lehigh Acres Dev., Inc., 188 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App.

1972)).

106.
107.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1584.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1586.
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
Molzof, 502 U.S. at 309.
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B. EVEN IF MOLZOF CONTROLLED FTCA WRONGFUL DEATH CASES, THE CHILDS
COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED THE PORTIONS OF GEORGIA WRONGFUL
DEATH DAMAGE AWARDS THAT ARE PUNITIVE

Even if Molzof controlled FTCA wrongful death cases, the Childs court
should have excluded the portions of the Georgia wrongful death damage
award that are punitive. By adopting the view that damages "intended to act
as punishment" should be excluded from damage awards, Molzofimplies that
I2
the courts exclude punitive portions of a state's wrongful death statute.

The Childs court failed to recognize the punitive aspects of the Georgia

wrongful death statute. It stated that Georgia courts have held that "punitive
damages" were not available under Georgia's wrongful death statute."' The
Childs court's statement, however, is inaccurate. Georgia courts have
interpreted portions of the Georgia wrongful death statute to be punitive."'
The cases that the Childs court cites merely stand for the proposition that
"punitive damages" are not available in addition to wrongful death damages.
Georgia courts have determined and repeatedly confirmed that the
Georgia wrongful death statute is partially punitive and partially
compensatory." s They have determined that the Georgia wrongful death
statute is punitive to the extent that it permits the recovery of more than the

plaintiff's actual loss."'

112. See id. at 306.

113. Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1584 (citing Engle v. Finch, 139 S.E. 868 (Ga. 1927);
Truelove v. Wilson, 285 S.E.2d 556 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981); Roescher v. Lehigh Acres Dev., Inc.,
188 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972).
114. See, e.g., Engle, 139 S.E. at 869 (holding that the Georgia wrongful death statute
is punitive to the extent that it permits recovery of more than the plaintiff's actual loss); Atlantic,
V. & W. R. Co. v. McDilda, 54 S.E. 140 (Ga. 1906) (noting that the Georgia wrongful death
statute is penal in that the recovery is for the full value of the life of the decedent, regardless of
its real value to the person in whom the cause of action is vested).
115. See Savannah Elec. Co. v. Bell, 53 S.E. 109 (Ga. 1906) ("The [wrongful death]
damages recovered by the plaintiff in this case are intended incidentally to compensate her for
the loss she has sustained, but primarily to punish the defendant for its negligence in bringing
about the death of a human being."). Id. at 112; Gielow v. Strickland, 363 S.E.2d 278,279 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he decision to punish [for wrongful death] was the legislature's... itchose
to do so by prescribing a particular measure of damages."); Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 319
S.E.2d 470,480 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) ("[P]unitive damages are not available in a wrongful death
claim since the Georgia statute to the extent it permits recovery of more than the actual loss to
the survivor, is itself punitive.") (citations omitted). But see C. Frederick Overby and Jason
Crawford, The CaseforAllowing PunitiveDamagesin Georgia Wrongful Death Actions: The
Need to Remove an UnjustAnomaly in GeorgiaLaw, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that
the Georgia Wrongful Death Act is not punitive and that it has been misconstrued by Georgia
courts).
116. Engle, 139 S.E. at 869; Ford Motor Co., 319 S.E.2d at 480.
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The Georgia wrongful death statute is partially punitive according to the
Molzof definition of "punitive" because a portion of the damage award is
designed to punish the tortfeasor. In SavannahElectric Company v. Bell, the
Georgia Supreme Court addressed the statute's penal nature:
The [Georgia wrongful death] statute is ... one that it
intended to inflict a punishment upon wrongdoers who
bring about the death of a human being by negligence ....
The General Assembly could have inflicted this punishment
either by indictment or by qui tam action where the
recovery would go to the public, but for reasons satisfactory
to the lawmaking power the punishment is inflicted through
the means of a civil action, and the penalty resulting is
bestowed by the public upon those17 who have suffered
directly by the act of the wrongdoer.'
In Harden,the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the composition
of the Georgia wrongful death statute in the context of an FTCA wrongful
death case." 8 Citing Georgia case law precedents, the Fifth Circuit recognized
the partly punitive nature of the Georgia wrongful death statute."9
Consequently, the Hardencourt refused to apply the punitive portions of the
Georgia wrongful death statute.12 0
Prior to Harden, the Fifth Circuit addressed the application of Georgia
law to FTCA wrongful death cases. In Hartz v. United States, the Fifth
Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether to reduce the decedent's "full
value of life" figure by estimating personal expenses and federal and state
taxes. 121 The court determined that the Georgia wrongful death statute was
punitive to the extent that it permitted recovery of more than the loss to the
survivor. 22 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held that it was appropriate to take
into account when calculating an FTCA wrongful
personal expenses and2 taxes
3
death damage award.1
The exclusion of personal expenses and taxes from FTCA wrongful
death actions applying Georgia law is not only mandated by precedent, it is
logical. In an FTCA wrongful death action, the survivors are only entitled to

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Savannah Elec. Co., 53 S.E. at 112.
Harden, 688 F.2d at 1029.
IU
Id.
415 F.2d at 264.
Id.
Id.
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the same benefit that they would have received if the decedent had lived. 4
Survivors cannot not logically and reasonably expect to receive that part of a
decedent's lost income that would have been paid in taxes or personal
expenses because neither the survivor nor the decedent would have had use of
the money if the decedent had lived.2 5 For example, decedents that were
salaried employees never actually receive the amount withheld from their
earnings for federal income tax purposes; therefore, their survivors would
never have received a direct benefit from that part of their earnings. 6 To
provide survivors with a financial windfall in an FTCA wrongful death case
ignores Congress' intent to limit the damage awards in wrongful death cases
27
to compensatory damages.
Molzof supports judicial inquiry into the nature of wrongful death
statutes.12 Thus, instead of rejecting Harden and Hartz, the Childs court
should have been guided by their examinations of Georgia's wrongful death
statute. The Harden and Hartz decisions chronicled the well-established
notion that the portion of the Georgia wrongful death statute that permits
plaintiffs to recover more than their actual losses is punitive. 29 Just as the
Hartz and Harden courts refused to apply the punitive portion of the Georgia
wrongful death statute, the Childs court should have refused to apply it.
Consequently, the Childs court should have excluded the decedents' personal
expenses and taxes from the wrongful death damages award because these
portions are deemed punitive under Georgia law.
CONCLUSION

Wrongful death damages under the FTCA are limited to actual or
compensatory damages, even after Molzof. In order to avoid misapplying
Molzof, courts and practitioners should recognize the limitations of the Molzof
decision. First, Moizof is strictly an FTCA personal injury case. It does not
apply to FTCA wrongful death cases. The statutory language and legislative
124.
Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 112 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Hartz v.
United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969)).
125. See Felder v. United States, 543 F.2d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 1976).
126. O'Connor v. United States, 269 F.2d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1959).
127. See Schuler v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 1088, 1094 (W.D. Mich. 1987) ...
[F]ailure to adjust damage awards to reflect tax liability is in conflict with the purposes of the
FTCA to compensate for losses sustained and not to provide a windfall which plaintiffs would
not have received had the tortious conduct not occurred.") (citation omitted).
128. See Mozlof, 502 U.S. at 309.
129. Harden v. United States, 688 F.2d 1025, 1029 (1982) (citing Hartz, 415 F.2d at
264); Hartz, 415 F.2d at 264 (citing Savannah Elec. Co. v. Bell, 53 S.E. 109, 112 (Ga. 1906);
Collins v. McPherson, 85 S.E.2d 552, 555 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954).
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history of the Act indicate that Congress intended to distinguish wrongful
death from other FTCA tort claims. In FTCA wrongful death cases, the
government's liability is limited to actual or compensatory damages based on
plaintiff's pecuniary injuries. Molzof recognized that this standard applies to
wrongful death torts. Second, even if Moizof were applied to wrongful death
claims, only the compensatory portions of a state's wrongful death statute
would be applied; the punitive portions would be ignored. Molzof suggests
that the court should determine the intent of the state legislatures in creating
wrongful death statutes prior to applying a state's wrongful death damage
award in an FTCA wrongful death action. After determining that portions of
the state's wrongful death statute are punitive, the court must exclude the
portion intended to serve as punishment.
The Childscourt misapplied the Molzofdecision. By awarding damages
that exceeded the actual or compensatory loss of the plaintiff in Childs, the
court misinterpreted the effect of Moizof on FTCA wrongful death damage
awards. The Childscourt's errors in applying the FTCA and Molzof decision
should alert courts and practitioners to the pitfalls that may be encountered in
FTCA wrongful death cases.

